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Petitioner Prosper Team, Inc. respectfully submits its reply brief on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
The critical issue on appeal is whether the Employment Security Act requires 
unemployment benefits to be awarded when some element of the employee's job is 
outside his or her control. In this case, both parties agree that Hickman did not and 
could not control the economy. By its ruling the Board effectively creates a new 
unemployment standard that awards unemployment benefits to all sales employees in 
virtually all instances because the economy will always be outside their control. 
I. PROSPER'S REPLY TO THE BOARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The Board in its Brief (hereinafter B. at ), states that it supplements and 
corrects Prosper Team Inc.'s (hereinafter ^Prosper") Statement of Fact. Prosper 
responds to1 and corrects the Board's supplemental facts as follows: 
• The Board cites to the record at R.60:6-l 1, that Hickman was Prosper's longest 
employed salesman. (B. at 3). The record indicates that Hickman saw a picture 
on a wall where various individuals in the picture did not appear to still be 
working at Prosper. This observation from a picture on a wall does not establish 
that Hickman is one of Prosper's longest employed salesmen, nor is there any 
other evidence to support this conclusion. 
1
 The Board's untimely filing of its Brief may impact its opportunity to participate 
in oral arguments, Utah R. App. P. 26(c), but Prosper still needs to respond to any 
perceived inaccuracies raised by the Board in its presentation of the facts. 
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• The Board states that after Hickman' surgery for a hernia, his sales started to 
decline. (B. at 3). The record establishes that Hickman's sales had started to 
decline months prior to his surgery. (R. at 055, 26-29). 
• The Board states that after Hickman underwent hernia surgery, that Hickman 
returned to work "prematurely". The record establishes that upon returning to 
work, Hickman testified that he "overdid it". (R. at 055, line 6). The record does 
not support the medical conclusion that Hickman returned to work prematurely. 
• The Board cites to the record at 055:26-29, that Hickman's supervisor continually 
assured him that the Employer would work with him to increase his sales. (B at 
4). The cited record establishes that Hickman asked his supervisor if the 
supervisor would "work with" him because of his hernia. The record does not 
establish that Hickman's supervisor "continually assured" him of anything, nor 
does the record establish that Hickman's requested that Prosper work with him to 
increase his sales. 
• The Board states that the "fine print" on the Employee Counseling Report says 
termination was a possible outcome for failure to improve. (B. at 4). The 
Employee Counseling Report does state that failure to improve could result in 
termination, but the referenced disclosure is in a font similar in size and emphasis 
as the other parts of the form. 
• The Board states that Hickman was not verbally informed at the meeting when 
he received his written warning that his job was in jeopardy. (B. at 4). The 
record does not establish whether Hickman was verbally warned at this time that 
2 
his job was in jeopardy, however, the record does establish that when the written 
warning was issued, the parties discussed specifics of the written warning (R. at 
042, lines 15-45). 
II. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN AWARDING 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE 
ECONOMY PREVENTED A FINDING OF "CONTROL". 
The issue on appeal is whether the Employment Security Act requires 
unemployment benefits to be awarded when an employee works under circumstances 
where he or she does not have complete control over all the factors involved in 
achieving success. The decision by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which the 
Workforce Appeals Board adopted "in foil the reasoning, conclusions of law and 
decision" states in part: 
The element of control has not been established. The Claimant did not have 
complete control over the low sales that led to his discharge. Increasing sales 
depended on others agreeing to purchase the Employer's services over other 
options for their money, which the Claimant could not control. There are many 
possible reasons a potential customer would choose not to use the Employer's 
services. ... In this case, there were too many other factors involved to give the 
Claimant control over his sales, including the poor economy and the high 
unemployment rate. (Emphasis added)(R. at 072). 
As the decision states, the Board believes that an employee needs to have 
"complete control" over all factors of their job in order to establish a just cause 
discharge. In this case that means having control over "others agreeing to purchase the 
Employer's services", the "poor economy", "the high unemployment rate", and "too 
many other factors". (R. at 072). By affirming the ALJ's decision, the Board establishes 
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what is tantamount to strict liability for employers that hire employees in sales.2 The 
Board supports its conclusion by reciting boilerplate language that factors not within an 
employee's control cannot be used to establish fault, and since Hickman could not have 
control over the economy, he cannot be at fault. (B. at 12). However, this conclusion 
skirts the analysis necessary to establish whether Hickman was at fault. 
In Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), the employee was discharged for attendance violations. Though some of the 
absences were due to medical problems beyond Stegen's control, this Court agreed that 
"other circumstances contributing to plaintiffs absenteeism resulted from poor planning 
and from personal situations within plaintiffs control." Therefore the denial of benefits 
was affirmed on the grounds that some of the circumstances leading to the separation 
were within the claimant's control. 
Here the Board cites the unpublished opinion of Market Reps, Inc., v. Workforce 
Appeals Bd, 2003 UT App 244 as establishing that "economic conditions can 
'materially and adversely' affect an employee's ability to meet productivity standards 
beyond the employee's control." (B. at 11). However, the Marketing Reps decision is 
not inconsistent with Stegen. The fact that economic conditions may adversely affect a 
2
 The scope of this decision goes well beyond employees in sales. The same 
argument can be made in many other industries such as by stock brokers who do not 
control the stock market or bank workers who fail to attract new customers because 
customers can always take their money to another bank. 
3
 The Board attempts to directly correlate the facts of this case into the facts of 
Market Reps. Though there are some similarities, there are also notable differences. 
First, in Market Reps the employee was sick for one week and then attempted to make 
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sales person's ability to meet productivity standards can be a factor in determining 
whether the separation was within the employee's control. The problem is that the 
Board is making the economic conditions the only factor in determining the issue of 
control. The Board argues that "Clearly, the Claimant does not have control over the 
economy, and despite the Employer's objections, if the Claimant lacked control over the 
external factor leading to his discharge, just cause is not shown." (Emphasis added)(B. 
at 12). 
The "external factor" (not factors) the Board references that Hickman lacked 
control over is the economy. Thus the sentence can more clearly be written to say that 
"if the Claimant lacked control over the economy (the external factor), just cause is not 
shown." Such a narrow view of the element of control is both inconsistent with the 
Department Rules ("A just cause discharge must include some fault on the part of the 
claimant" R994-405-201(2010)), as well as the holding in Stegen. The correct analysis 
is to determine whether Hickman was at fault in causing the separation. 
There were a variety of factors within Hickman's control and it is Prosper's 
position that it was these factors that led to the separation. Factors such as his attitude, 
sales right after Christmas. In this case, Hickman had only two sales in a six month 
period. Second, in that case the employer did not challenge the Board's factual findings 
and the decision was made "relying on the unchallenged findings of the Board" Id. at 
f 6. Here, Prosper has challenged the Board's findings that it was the economy that 
caused the separation and Prosper also challenged the Board's findings regarding the 
element of knowledge. Third, the Board in Marketing Reps concluded the economy 
affected the employee's ability to make sales, whereas here, the Board is arguing that a 
just cause discharge cannot be established unless it is shown that the employee was in 
control of all external factors related to the separation, including the economy. 
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(R. at 044, lines 33-37), whether Hickman put his phone on "busy" to block further 
calls, (R. at 052, lines 31-32), whether he uses a shorter script (R. at 043, lines 1-6), and 
whether he was positive and confident about the products being offered (R. at 046, lines 
22-30). 
Also, a fact that cannot be understated is that other similarly situated employees 
were being successful under the same circumstances. (R. at 049, lines 1-7). Hickman 
was the only person on the whole team that was terminated for lack of performance. 
Others on the same team were receiving the same calls, selling the same product, 
working the same hours, and operating under the same conditions. They were able to 
make sales under the same circumstances that Hickman could not. Thus the appropriate 
analysis is not whether Hickman had complete control over the economy, but rather, 
whether it was within Hickman's control to make sales similar to the other employees 
around him.4 Prosper asserts that it was Hickman's continued inefficiency or lack of care 
that led to the separation and not the economy outside his control. 
4
 The Board suggests that the cases of Self v. Board of Review, 453A.2d 170(NJ. 
1982), and Yardville Supply Co., v. Board of Review, 544 A.2d 1337 (N.J. 1989) are not 
on point. (B. at 13). However, the Board misinterprets the relevance of the cases. In 
Self the employee lost his ride to work when a fellow employee quit and in Yardville the 
employee lost his license when he was driving drunk. Both of these cases resulted in 
loss of employment due to external factors. The cases are cited to establish that when 
external factors result in a loss of employment, and the employer did not influence those 
factors (had the employer in moved the company in Self or had the employer required 
the employee to drive knowing he was under the influence in Yardville), examiners need 
to carefully establish whether the employee was at fault and not automatically award 
benefits on the grounds that the employee was not in control of the external factor. 
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The Board seeks support for its conclusions by making various references to 
Hickman's lack of "ability11 to make sales. For example, on page 15 of their Brief, the 
Board states "Department Rule R994-405-202 provides: fif the claimant made a good 
faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to lack of ability and a 
discharge results, just cause is not established.'" (See also B. at 11) Unfortunately, the 
Board does not accurately quote is own Rule. R994-405-202(3)(b) provides that if an 
employee fails to meet the job requirements "due to a lack of skill or ability, then just 
cause is not established." It is well established that the "ability" referenced in this Rule 
is the skill and ability to do his or her job, not whether the employee was inhibited or 
prohibited from doing his or her job due to some extrinsic factor. 
The Boards also makes various references to Hickman "ill health" as being a 
significant factor in why he was unable to make sales. Though this may have been true 
in the Market Reps decision, the same is not true here. Prosper does not want to 
diminish the fact that Hickman was experiencing some medical issues due to a hernia, 
but a hernia isn't an incapacitating injury that prevented Hickman from working. 
Hickman reduced his hours to during the month of July to work part-time. Hickman 
was released to return to full time work on August 3, 2009. Therefore, the Court should 
not view a one month part-time work adjustment as justifying months and months 
without sales. Even ignoring the lack of performance prior to surgery, after returning to 
full-time work Hickman had three months to make sales before being terminated. Yet in 
this three month period he only made one sale. If Hickman's health issues reduced his 
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ability to make sales during the month of July, his release and return to work gave him 
sufficient time to reestablish making regular sales. Hickman failed to do so. 
Hickman had been successful in the past, and similarly situated employees were 
being successful in the present. Prosper asserts that it was Hickman's inefficiency that 
led to his separation. The Board was arbitrary and capricious to hold that a lack of 
control over the economy is sufficient to establish a lack of control to do his job. 
Prosper asserts that to require an employer to prove that a terminated employee has 
control over all external factors that may relate to his or her job is neither supported by 
the law, nor is it a policy that should be adopted. Such a standard essentially creates a 
strict liability for employers and is not contemplated by the Employment Security Act. 
The Board's decision should be reversed. 
III. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN RULING THAT 
THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. 
The Board asserts that Prosper failed to establish the element of knowledge for a 
just cause discharge. Oddly, the Board ignores the fact that Hickman admits to 
receiving both verbal and written warnings before his termination (R. at 009); that he 
understood why he was terminated, (R. at 009); that he was aware of others that had 
been terminated for the same reason (R. at 061, lines 29-31); and that the ALJ found 
Hickman knew what was expected of him. (R. at 072). 
The Board attempts to shoehorn the facts of this case to correlate with the 
unpublished opinion of Harley Davidson v. Workforce App. Bd., 2006 UT App 61. The 
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Board inaccurately suggests that Hickman did not understand he would be terminated 
because Prosper's warnings were "vague and inconsistent". (B. at 8). However, there is 
little if any evidence to suggest that the warnings were either vague or inconsistent. 
In applying for unemployment benefits Hickman filled out the Department's 
application for benefits by responding: 
Were you told to change or improve your job performance? YES 
Did you receive any warning before being fired or discharged? YES 
If yes, how were you warned? VERBAL 
When? 10/03/09 
Have others been fired or discharged for the same reason? YES 
How did you violate the policy? BECAUSE OF LACK OF SALE 
(R. at 009, Exhibit 9)(Responses in Bold). 
There does not appear to be anything vague or inconsistent with Hickman's responses to 
the Department's questions. 
On October 3, 2009, Prosper issue Hickman a verbal warning. Hickman admits 
to receiving this verbal warning. (R. at 009). When things did not improve over the 
next two weeks, Hickman's supervisor talked with him again and issued him a written 
warning. (R. at 013). There is nothing vague or inconsistent with this approach. The 
evidence suggests that Hickman recognized the October discussions to be warnings 
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rather than general encouragement because he specifically identified them as warnings. 
When Hickman's performance did not improve, he was terminated.5 
Rather than taking a reasonable view of Prospers measured and methodical 
approach, the Board seems to focus on whether Hickman thought his termination was 
"imminent". (B. at 9). The Board goes so far as to criticize Prosper's actions by 
advancing the illogical argument that even though Hickman admitted receiving 
warnings prior to being fired, "a 'warning before being fired' does not indicate that he 
received a warning that he was going to be fired'' (Original emphasis)(B. at 10). By its 
very nature a warning communicates a cautionary message that needs to be heeded. As 
such, Hickman's "warning before being fired" communicated the cautionary message 
that Hickman needed to improve his performance or he was "going to be fired". 
The Board also suggests that even though Hickman had received both a verbal 
and written warnings, that his "supervisor continually assured" him that Prosper would 
"work with him".6 The record does not establish that Prosper "continually assure" 
5
 The Board criticizes Prosper for giving Hickman eight days after the final written 
warning before termination. However, as established by the record, Hickman received a 
verbal warning on October 3, 2009. This gives Hickman 25 days between the first 
warning and his termination. Prosper testified that it only takes a day or two to turn a 
lead into a sale, and as such, even if Hickman only had eight days, according to the 
testimony, this was sufficient time to show improved activity in sales. (R. at 043, lines 
17-28). 
6
 The Board, on page 8 of its Brief, states: "The Claimant credibly testified he 
believed Mr. Johnson would continue to work with him until his sales improved." This 
statement is not supported by the record. (B. at 8, citing R.55:26-29). The cited 
testimony shows that Hickman testified Prosper would work with him regarding his 
hernia, but there is no evidence that Proper would work with Hickman until his sales 
improved. 
10 
Hickman of anything. Hickman's testimony about Proper agreeing to "work with" him 
arises out of a requests for latitude regarding his not feeling well. (R. at 055, lines 28-
29). However, the issue of "working with" an employee has been previously addressed 
inlaw Offices of David Paul White & Assoc, v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 21 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
In Law Offices of David Paul White, the employer gave the employee instruction 
regarding appropriate behavior. The employee's behavior would improve for several 
days and then revert back to the former behavior. In awarding benefits the Board 
concluded that whatever counseling the employer gave was negated by the employer's 
continued acceptance of her behavior. Id. at 25. In reversing, this Court explicitly 
rejected as not being reasonable and rational the conclusion that "whatever counseling 
the employer gave the claimant with regard to her 'office personality' was negated by his 
continued acceptance of her behavior so that ultimately the claimant was not given a 
clear standard of what the employer expected of her." (Emphasis added). Id. at 25. This 
Court found that "An employer who is willing to take ample time to work with an 
employee to resolve objectionable conduct ought not to be penalized when he finally 
terminates the employee." Id. A similar conclusion is appropriate here. 
Prosper gave Hickman specific verbal and written warnings instructing him to 
improve his performance. It does not reflect sound policy to penalize Prosper for not 
firing Hickman five months earlier. It does not reflect sound policy to assert that if a 
company "works with" an employee, it cannot terminate them because the message will 
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be "inconsistent" or somehow the employee won't think the termination was 
"imminent."7 Hickman was expected to make sales each week. Any employee in a sales 
position would reasonably anticipate that if he or she makes only two sales in six 
months, and no sales in the months prior to a verbal and written warning, that unless 
performance improved, he or she would be terminated. 
Based on the record as a whole, it is neither reasonable nor rational for the Board 
to assert that Prosper's warnings were vague or inconsistent. The Board's decision is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record. Grace 
Drilling Co., v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and the element 
of "knowledge" should be deemed to have been satisfied. 
IV. PROSPER SATISFIED IS OBLIGATION TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
The Board argues that Prosper failed to marshal the evidence to support of its 
claim that Hickman was terminated for just cause. This argument is contrary to the 
information presented in Prosper's brief 
The marshaling obligation requires Prosper to locate and disclose the evidence 
supporting findings that are challenged. In this matter, Prosper challenged two findings: 
first, the mixed question of law and fact whether the economy prevented Hickman from 
having "control" over the factors leading to his separation, and second, whether 
7
 The Board further asserts that Hickman believe he was somehow entitled to 
"special treatment". (B. at 10). Not only did Hickman never suggest such he was 
entitled to "special treatment", but grounds the Board cites to supporting this conclusion 
are similarly not supported by the record and are disputed by Prosper. 
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Hickman had knowledge that if his performance did not improve he would be 
terminated. 
In Prosper's Statement of Facts, Heading II, Page 5, Prosper included a Section 
entitled "Marshaled Facts Supporting Terminated[sic]Was Without Cause". This 
Section cites to the Hickman's single reference to the economy as well as to Hickman's 
statement that customers might not want to spend money. It also identifies that 
Hickman felt he was using a slower script and that at times he wasn't feeling well. The 
marshaled facts identify that Hickman claimed Prosper would "work with him", and that 
he claims he never heard the word "fired". (Petitioner's brief at 5). As such Prosper 
identified the portions of the record that support the Board's findings. 
On page 10, Prosper specifically states that the Board found it was not within 
Hickman's control to do his job because of the nature of the economy and because 
consumers could spend their money elsewhere (Petitioner's brief at 10). Prosper then 
proceeded to establish that it was Hickman's inefficiency that led to his separation and 
not the status of the economy. In fact, Prosper dedicated Section I, Subpart D, of its 
brief to explaining that the finding that the economy wasn't in Hickman's control was 
inconsistent with Hickman's own view of whether sales were within his control. The 
Board neither cites to nor references any material fact that Prosper omitted or failed to 
marshal regarding the disputed finding. 
Similarly, regarding the issue of "knowledge", Prosper stated that Hickman 
believe that Prosper would continue to work with him (Petitioner's brief at 21), and that 
he claims he never heard the word "fired" (Petitioner's brief at 5). Prosper then 
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proceeded to establish why this factual finding was inconsistent with, and not supported 
by, the whole record. Prosper acknowledges that it did not specifically address 
Hickman's claim that he wasn't told he would be "fired", but there is no legal 
requirement to use the word fired, and thus Prosper was not obligated to specifically 
refuted it. The Board neither cites to nor references any material fact that Prosper 
omitted or failed to marshal regarding the issue of "knowledge". 
Contrary to the Board's assertion, Prosper identified the disputed findings, culled 
the record to see what evidence supported the findings, identified the portions of the 
record supporting the findings, and then proceeded to show how the record did not 
support the findings. Prosper satisfied its marshaling obligation by identify the record 
that supported the Board's findings, and the record shows that Hickman was in 
sufficient control of the sales process and that he had reasonable knowledge that he 
would be terminated. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals Board's 
decision affirming the award of unemployment benefits and find it was an abuse of 
discretion to award unemployment benefits in this matter. 
DATED this _[0_ day of November, 2010. 
Daniel J. Anderson 
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner 
Prosper Team, Inc. 
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